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Abstract
New Zealand has one of the highest rates of imprisonment in the 
OECD. The current Labour prime minister and the most recent 
National prime minister have both expressed support for addressing 
the rate of imprisonment. Nonetheless, New Zealand’s prison 
population continues to grow and is forecast to continue growing. 
This article investigates Texas’s experience of criminal justice reform; 
in particular, how they achieved a bipartisan consensus in favour 
of reform. It then looks at what lessons Texas’s experience might 
offer New Zealand. Finally, it highlights shortcomings of the Texan 
approach and what these might mean for New Zealand.
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Texas: tough on crime and back again
In the 1970s Texas’s imprisonment rate was 
only marginally higher than New Zealand’s 
current rate of imprisonment. Texas wasn’t 
the most progressive state in America, but 
it had a lower rate of imprisonment than 
other large states such as California and 
Florida. 
All that changed in the early 1990s 
when Texas enthusiastically embraced a 
tough on crime approach to law and order 
(see Figure 1). Although similar approaches 
had already been taken in other states, 
Texas was one of the most enthusiastic 
adopters. By the end of the 1990s its 
imprisonment rate had tripled, leaving it 
with more prisoners than any other state 
in a country with the highest rate of 
imprisonment in the OECD (Duffin, 2019).
But all that changed in the mid-2000s, 
with Texas turning away from a tough on 
crime approach to (at times hesitatingly) 
embrace criminal justice reform. Since 
2006 Texas has managed to reduce its 
prison population by nearly 15,000 and its 
imprisonment rate by over 23%. Over the 
same period the crime rate dropped by 
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nearly 45% and the violent crime rate by 
nearly 20%.
Meanwhile, in New Zealand ...
New Zealand’s recent history has been very 
different (see Figure 2). Like Texas, New 
Zealand has experienced a steady decline 
in crime rates. However, New Zealand’s 
imprisonment rate has been steadily 
increasing. Directly comparing Texas 
and New Zealand, while both countries 
experienced large drops in the crime 
rate between 2002 and 20141 (43% in 
Texas and 30% in New Zealand), Texas’s 
imprisonment rate declined by 17%, while 
New Zealand’s increased by 33%.
Despite the fact that New Zealand’s 
crime rate is expected to continue to 
decline, the most recent justice sector 
forecast, shown in Figure 3, suggests that 
the prison population will continue to rise, 
albeit at a slower rate than previous 
forecasts (Ministry of Justice, 2018). This 
is a continuation of a long-term trend that 
commenced in the late 1980s, before which 
New Zealand’s prison population had 
grown at around the same rate as the 
population for nearly 30 years (Ministry of 
Justice Criminal Policy Justice Group, 
1998).
This article focuses on two narrow 
questions: how did Texas reduce its prison 
population; and what lessons, if any, might 
this have for New Zealand? The article does 
not address other important questions 
relating to New Zealand’s imprisonment 
rate, including whether it should be 
reduced. However, both the current prime 
minister, Jacinda Ardern, and former prime 
minister Bill English have made comments 
supportive of addressing the imprisonment 
rate. This suggests that a discussion of a 
similar jurisdiction that has reduced its 
imprisonment rate would be a useful 
addition to the policy discussion.
But … Texas?
Even for those who accept that New 
Zealand’s high imprisonment rate is a 
problem that needs to be addressed, Texas 
may not be the most obvious model. 
Instead, the Scandinavian countries 
are often held up as the best model to 
follow. They are much more successful 
at rehabilitating prisoners: their two-
year reoffending rates are 20–35%; New 
Figure 1: Texas imprisonment rate and crime rates
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Figure 2: New Zealand crime rate and imprisonment rate (1993-2014)
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Figure 3: New Zealand prison population and forecast (2018)
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Zealand’s rate is around 60%. They do this 
while having a low rate of imprisonment 
and prison conditions that are less harsh 
than those in most Western countries. 
Many New Zealand researchers have 
investigated the Scandinavian model and 
returned with valuable information (for 
instance, Sinclair, 2017; Ministry of Justice 
Criminal Policy Justice Group, 1998; Pratt 
et al., 2013). However, to the degree that 
they were hoping to change the trajectory 
of the prison population their efforts 
haven’t been a success. New Zealand’s 
prison population has continued to grow.
There are two obvious potential 
explanations for this:
•	 the	Scandinavian	countries	are	simply	
too different from New Zealand for 
their model to be easily adopted;
•	 their	model	is	adoptable	but	looking	
there provides information on what we 
should aim for, but no guidance on how 
we should get there.
Texas can help address both of these 
issues. As Table 1 shows, it is similar to New 
Zealand in some important respects. These 
similarities may mean that it is easier to 
implement aspects of the Texas model in 
New Zealand, or that there are lessons that 
can be taken from Texas that cannot be 
taken from Scandinavian countries. 
The other advantage of investigating 
Texas is that it can offer evidence of how to 
begin the journey to a lower level of 
imprisonment. In this respect, research on 
the Scandinavian countries has provided 
valuable information on the end point, but 
no guidance on how to start making 
changes to get there. Research on Texas will 
help to fill this gap and provide a more 
complete picture of the changes needed.
No jurisdiction is a perfect analogue of 
New Zealand and Texas is different in 
important ways. However, differences 
between New Zealand and other 
jurisdictions generally and Texas in 
particular are often overstated. For instance, 
the Department of Corrections paper 
‘Where New Zealand stands internationally: 
a comparison of offence profiles and 
recidivism rates’ (Boomen, 2018) is often 
cited as a demonstration that New Zealand’s 
high imprisonment rate is a response to 
more serious offences or that other 
jurisdictions have only succeeded in 
reducing their imprisonment rate because 
they are managing less serious offenders. 
However, there are a number of factors that 
prevent these conclusions from being drawn.
The Corrections paper’s initial promise 
is to investigate a factor that may influence 
New Zealand’s high imprisonment rate. 
However, the factor chosen – prison offence 
profile – has very little explanatory power. 
It should not be surprising that a country 
with a high rate of imprisonment responds 
to offending, particularly serious offending, 
with harsher penalties. For this to be even 
a partial explanation for New Zealand’s 
high rate of imprisonment these types of 
offences would have to be more common 
in New Zealand than in other jurisdictions.
Comparing crime rates between 
jurisdictions can be challenging (see, for 
instance, Alvazzi del Frate, 2010). Murder 
is sometimes used as a proxy for overall 
crime because it is subject to fewer of these 
challenges. Table 2 shows murder rates in 
a variety of jurisdictions.
These figures support the contention 
that rather than New Zealand’s high 
imprisonment rate being a reaction to 
serious crime, New Zealand sentences are 
harsher than those of other countries for 
similar offences.
There is also some evidence that New 
Zealand takes a broader definition of 
violent crime than other countries. For 
instance, Segessenmann (2002) finds that 
taking definitions at face value, New 
Zealand’s violent crime rate in 2000 was 
around twice that of the United States, but, 
adjusting for definitional differences, New 
Zealand’s violent crime rate is actually 
around one fourth of the United States’.
‘Where New Zealand stands 
internationally’ also makes the claim that 
‘the high proportion of prisoners sentenced 
for violence offences means New Zealand 
lacks the same high numbers of non-
violent offenders other jurisdictions (such 
as Texas, Portugal, Georgia, and Italy) have 
targeted to reduce their prison numbers’ 
(Boomen, 2018). This is based on analysis 
of a paper from 2009 from the Council of 
State Governments which assessed Texas’s 
2007 reforms. This was one part of a large 
package of reforms passed in Texas in 2007. 
This means that the Corrections paper 
ignores the reforms passed in the six 
subsequent legislative sessions. Reforms 
that were ignored include measures that 
achieved a nearly 80% reduction in the 
number of young people in prison – a 
group typically at higher risk of reoffending 
and with clear relevance to New Zealand 
(achieving the same outcome here would 
result in a roughly 3.5% reduction in the 
prison population). Even looking solely at 
the 2007 reforms, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that Texas focused primarily on 
‘decreasing technical violations and recalls’, 
given that they also included measures such 
as prison and community-based drug 
treatment and pre-trial diversion.
A valuable point that the paper could 
have made is to highlight the challenge of 
path dependency. New Zealand may have 
Table 1: Comparability of Scandinavia and Texas to New Zealand
Scandinavia Texas
English-speaking ✘ ✔️
Large minority population ✘ ✔️
Significant recent drop in imprisonment ✘ ✔️
Rapidly growing population ✘ ✔️
History of ‘tough on crime’ policies ✘ ✔️
Table 2: Murder rates of various jurisdictions (2016)
Australia 0.94
England and Wales 1.22
United States 5.35
Texas 5.3
OECD average 3.7
New Zealand 1.06
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Intentional Homicide Victims database, 2018 (Australia, England and Wales, United 
States); NZ Police, 2018a; OECD, 2016; Texas Department of Public Safety, 2017 (Texas).
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similar overall levels of offending, but our 
response to this offending has tended to be 
harsher than in comparable jurisdictions 
and this has likely been the case for over 30 
years. In this scenario, it is valuable to have 
an example of a jurisdiction that has 
followed a similar path to New Zealand and 
has managed to change course. This is one 
of the respects in which Texas’s experience 
may hold useful lessons for New Zealand.
Key questions
Achieving a durable change to New 
Zealand’s criminal justice system will 
require gaining and maintaining the 
confidence of at least two of: the Labour 
Party, the National Party and the public. 
The word ‘confidence’ is chosen deliberately. 
Enthusiastic support isn’t necessary; even 
indifference from the public or opposition 
can be enough, as long as the party in 
power is motivated to act.
For instance, Finland reduced its rate 
of imprisonment by over 50% between 
1950 and the late 1990s. This was achieved 
after the public lost confidence in the status 
quo,2 giving experts and politicians 
permission to overhaul the system to 
address their concerns without requiring 
a deep understanding of or involvement in 
the details of the overhaul (Younge, 2001).
In the case of Texas it appears that the 
two political parties reached a consensus 
that reform was needed. Therefore, one of 
the key questions this article seeks to 
answer is: how did Texas reach a bipartisan 
consensus on the need for criminal justice 
reform? The model of reform described 
above is obviously a simplification. For 
instance, the three parties aren’t 
independent of each other – a major loss 
of confidence by the public would be likely 
to undermine the confidence of one or 
both major political parties. This is a 
substantial challenge to any reform because, 
by their nature, reforms involve making 
large changes to a complex and dynamic 
system designed to manage risk rather than 
certainty. Problems and unforeseen issues 
should be seen as an inevitable part of any 
reform of the scale of the criminal justice 
system. So, the second key question is: how 
did Texas maintain public confidence in 
the changes being implemented and the 
broader criminal justice system through 
the process of reform?
Answering these questions will help 
New Zealand in its efforts to commence an 
overdue reform of our criminal justice 
system.
How did Texas reach a bipartisan consensus?
To understand how Texas decided it 
needed to reduce its imprisonment rate, 
it is necessary to consider how it reached 
such a high rate of imprisonment in the 
first place (see Figure 4).
In the 1970s Texas’s prison population 
was substantially lower. While its rate of 
imprisonment wasn’t one of the lowest in 
America, it was lower than in other large 
states such as California and Florida. In the 
1990s a range of factors came together to 
drive a massive increase in the prison 
population. First, crime rates, particularly 
violent crime rates, sharply increased from 
the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, leading 
to increasing punitiveness and support for 
harsh punishments, such as the death 
penalty (Siegel, 2016). Second, there was a 
growing pessimism about the ability to 
reform offenders (known as the ‘nothing 
works’ movement) (Miller, 1989). Even 
though this pessimism was well on the way 
to being disproved, it had received 
substantial publicity and held sway over 
Figure 4: Texas prison population
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Figure 5: Texas imprisonment rate and crime rates
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policymakers. This led to bipartisan 
support for tough on crime policies: Bill 
Clinton provided $US12.5 billion for new 
prisons for states that passed harsher 
sentencing laws (Chettiar and Eisen, 2016), 
while Texas’s Democratic governor built 
100,000 new prison beds between 1990 and 
1994 (Wilson, 2014).
As Figure 5 shows, growth in the prison 
population continued at a slower rate in 
the late 1990s, falling to a (relative) trickle 
in the early 2000s. 
In 2005 Jerry Madden, a Republican, 
was appointed to lead the House 
Corrections Committee, with one 
instruction from the ultraconservative 
Republican speaker: ‘don’t build new 
prisons, they cost too much’. Colleagues 
advised him that the expert on criminal 
justice reform was Democratic senator 
John Whitmire. Madden and Whitmire 
realised that new prisons would be required 
unless substantial reform was implemented. 
Together Madden and Whitmire crafted a 
package of reforms that they thought could 
receive support from both their parties.
Madden’s instruction not to build new 
prisons reflected a concern among 
Republicans that prison costs would 
undermine their ability to pursue other 
priorities, such as keeping the size of 
government (and taxes) small. Republican 
support was also driven by an emerging 
loss of faith in prisons. There was no debate 
around prison for the most serious 
offenders, but Republicans had begun to 
doubt whether the prospect of prisons was 
deterring crime, or whether prisons were 
the best place to reform, particularly for 
people whose offending was a symptom of 
more fundamental mental health needs or 
drug and alcohol addiction.
Democratic support was easier to 
achieve. Democrats were out of power in 
the House and Senate and did not hold any 
of the six elected statewide offices. Criminal 
justice reform was not one of their key 
priorities, but it aligned with their values 
and they were willing to offer their support.3
For both parties the decision was made 
easier by a steady decline in the crime rate, 
which meant that while the public still 
generally supported tough on crime policies, 
it was not an issue of major concern to most 
voters. This was consistent with surveys of 
public attitudes which found that key voting 
groups were open to reform, particularly 
regarding moving to a rehabilitative rather 
than punitive focus for people whose 
offending was related to mental health or 
drug and alcohol addiction.
However, things did not progress 
smoothly. In 2005 Governor Rick Perry 
vetoed their legislation after it had passed 
both the Texas Senate and House with 
bipartisan support (Henson, 2005). Since 
the Texas legislature sits only in odd-
numbered years, this meant reform couldn’t 
be put in place until 2007 at the earliest. 
To improve the likelihood of success the 
two key legislators assembled a bipartisan 
group of think tanks and advocacy groups 
to develop a package of reforms. The group 
included five organisations, ranging from 
the American Civil Liberties Union to the 
Koch brothers-funded Texas Public Policy 
Foundation. The two legislators promised 
to consider any package of reforms the 
group produced, with two conditions: the 
package had to be evidence-based, and every 
measure had to have consensus support. 
Reforms were given added impetus by 
projections that Texas would need an 
additional 17,000 beds in five years, at a 
cost of US$2 billion to build and operate. 
Texas has to operate a balanced budget (i.e. 
they are not allowed to run a deficit), 
meaning funding this prison expansion 
would have required tax hikes, which was 
anathema to the Republicans who 
controlled the legislature, or extreme 
spending cuts that would have been 
unpopular and difficult to pass. This fact 
coupled with the reform proposals that had 
been crafted by the think tanks finally 
meant progress could be made. In 2007 a 
US$241 million package of reforms was 
passed by the House and Senate and signed 
into law by Governor Perry.
Reflecting on the 2007 reforms and 
subsequent efforts, both Madden and 
members of the coalition (subsequently 
formalised and expanded as the Texas 
Smart-On-Crime Coalition (Texas Smart-
On-Crime Coalition, 2019)) believed that 
the bipartisan coalition and the focus on 
consensus were essential to the reforms. 
Different members of the group were able 
to use their relationships and credibility 
with different members of the legislature 
to build support and the focus on consensus 
guaranteed that only reforms with broad 
support progressed.4
The think tanks also, particularly 
among liberal groups, highlighted the 
value of drawing on lived experience. A 
large number of the people involved in 
policy development and advocacy had 
personal experience of imprisonment and 
drug and/or alcohol addiction, or being a 
victim of crime. These experiences gave 
them increased credibility with legislators 
and the media and helped to put a human 
face to those in the criminal justice system. 
This made it easier to build support for 
reform and has resulted in profound 
changes in the views of some legislators.
How did Texas maintain public confidence?
As in New Zealand, the media is one of 
the public’s key sources of information on 
criminal justice in Texas. However, because 
the media in Texas tends to operate at 
either the city or national level, it is less 
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likely that a high-profile crime will result 
in a widespread loss of support for reform 
among legislators. For instance, a high-
profile crime in Dallas will be covered in 
detail in local Dallas media, but is less likely 
to be covered in Fort Worth media and very 
unlikely to be covered in Houston media. 
However, many individual reforms 
operate at the county level, meaning there 
is a greater risk of local reforms being 
derailed by a loss of public confidence. The 
first critical step in reducing the risk of a loss 
of public confidence is to engage the public 
prior to a high-profile event occurring. For 
instance, providing some basic factual 
information in an engaging manner either 
directly or through the media can help to 
build general support for the criminal 
justice system. This is consistent with New 
Zealand research which found a correlation 
between low levels of self-reported 
knowledge of the criminal justice system 
and low levels of confidence in its 
effectiveness (Colmar Brunton, 2016).
Highlighting success stories from 
community-based programmes can also 
help to ensure that the public have a source 
of information on the extremely high 
success rates of community-based 
programmes. As in other areas, this is also 
an example of Texas making use of lived 
experience to help engage and inform the 
public and decision makers.
Advocates in Texas also worked directly 
with key figures in the media to ensure they 
had some basic knowledge of the criminal 
justice system and access to key factual 
information. This ensures that negative 
media is placed within a broader context. 
This often results in failures being presented 
as isolated cases rather than indicative of 
broader systemic failures.
Unfortunately, the criminal justice 
system fundamentally involves dealing 
with risk; even a perfectly functioning 
system will not be able to prevent all harm. 
Where serious harm has occurred there is 
a risk of a public loss of confidence, 
particularly when the individual has 
previously committed a serious offence 
(even if the individual was unlikely to 
offend, the public and media are more 
focused on seriousness than risk) or has a 
large number of previous offences.
Texas has not been able to identify any 
easy response to this situation. However, 
there were two recurring themes – 
leadership and credibility. It is essential that 
the person ultimately responsible for a 
programme is confident in the programme 
and willing to work hard to maintain it in 
the face of obstacles. Second, the person 
needs credibility. In general, this seemed 
to refer to basic things such as being able 
to front media credibly. This is usually less 
of an issue in New Zealand, but can be 
problematic in Texas where there are a 
much larger number of elected officials 
who may feel an obligation to engage with 
the media.
Importantly, being willing to persevere 
shouldn’t be confused with a refusal to make 
changes. There were numerous examples of 
changes made to programmes after failures 
both large and small. However, these failures 
and the consequent changes were always 
seen as isolated and not indicative of more 
fundamental systemic issues.5
Problems and limitations with Texas’s 
approach
Although there is a lot for New Zealand 
to learn from what has happened in Texas, 
it is also important to highlight problems 
they have faced and limitations to their 
approach.
The death penalty
Advocacy groups from the left and right 
of Texas politics have been able to work 
together by focusing on their common 
goal of reducing the prison population. On 
the right this goal is driven by fiscal and 
effectiveness concerns, while on the left it 
is driven by concerns over inequity and 
unfairness. These different motivations 
mean that they disagree on some important 
issues or their relative priority, which is 
reflected in limited progress addressing 
these issues.
One example is the death penalty (see 
Figure 6), where Texas consistently 
accounts for between a third and half of all 
executions in the United States (for 
comparison, Texas accounts for nearly 9% 
of the United States population and around 
10% of all prisoners). For the left this is an 
important area where reform is required. 
For the right, the fiscal impact of the death 
penalty is negligible and the evidence on 
effectiveness is ambiguous.
This demonstrates that while Texas has 
forged a bipartisan consensus on the need 
to reduce the imprisonment rate, this 
consensus is based on a narrow area of 
agreement and progress has been limited 
in areas where the two groups’ priorities 
do not align.
Racial inequality
In New Zealand, Mäori make up around 
15% of the population but around 50% of 
the prison population. In Texas, African 
Americans make up around 12% of the 
population but around 33% of the prison 
population.6
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Figure 6: Use of the death penalty in Texas
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The African American imprisonment 
rate has declined slightly in recent years. 
However, it is clear that progressive groups 
in Texas saw addressing this as a much 
greater priority than did more conservative 
groups. Again, this indicates a difference in 
priorities: those primarily interested in 
reducing the number of people in prison 
will be less interested in racial inequality 
than those driven by concern for inequity 
and fairness.
This is a critical issue for New Zealand. 
For instance, the expansion of home 
detention (as has recently been discussed) 
would reduce the prison population, but 
based on the existing approach this would 
most likely be by releasing primarily 
Päkehä prisoners (Horwood, 2012). For 
anyone concerned simply with reducing 
the prison population this would be a 
success, but for anyone concerned about 
the extremely high rate of Mäori 
imprisonment concerns would remain.
Long-term investment in prevention
Finally, Texas has struggled to build support 
for large investments in early intervention 
even when these can be shown to have a 
long-term pay-off in terms of preventing 
offending. This has tended to be less of an 
issue for New Zealand. For example, the 
social investment model championed by 
Bill English could be seen as an attempt 
to develop a rigorous approach to early 
intervention and prevention.
Conclusion
The aim of my research was to answer 
two key questions: how did Texas reach a 
bipartisan consensus, and how did Texas 
maintain public confidence?
Texas formed a bipartisan consensus on 
the need for reform, but not on the reasons 
why this was necessary. Republicans were 
primarily driven by concerns about the cost 
of prisons and a loss of confidence in 
prisons’ ability to effectively reform 
(particularly in comparison to programmes 
in the community). Democrats were driven 
by concerns about inequality and fairness. 
For New Zealand, this suggests that 
seeking to appeal to conservatives primarily 
on the basis of inequality or fairness, or 
liberals primarily on the basis of fiscal 
responsibility, is unlikely to be successful. 
Instead, the need for reform should be 
argued for on the basis of their existing 
values: arguments aimed at conservatives 
should primarily focus on the cost of 
prison and its ineffectiveness at improving 
public safety, while arguments aimed at 
progressives should primarily focus on 
fairness and equality.
At the state level the media landscape 
in Texas made it harder for public 
confidence to be undermined statewide. 
Local officials worked hard to build public 
confidence by proactively educating the 
public and media on the effectiveness of 
programmes, making particular use of 
lived experience. Unfortunately, there is no 
magic bullet for maintaining public 
confidence in the face of a crisis; the only 
approach that worked in Texas was to make 
use of credible people who could lead a 
public response.
New Zealand currently has around 
10,000 people in prison, costing around $1 
billion per annum just to manage the 
prison system. Texas has demonstrated that 
it is possible to make significant reductions 
in the imprisonment rate, realising large 
savings and simultaneously improving 
public safety. A similar opportunity is 
available to New Zealand, if politicians, the 
media and the public are willing to take it.
1 NZ Police changed the way it recorded crime in late 2014, 
focusing on victim and offender numbers. This makes it 
difficult to make longitudinal comparisons after this date.
2 Interestingly, the reasons for this contain echoes of the Texan 
experience – see Lahti, 2017.
3 This is not to say that no Democrats were interested in 
criminal justice reform or that no Republican was concerned 
about equity. These are generalisations about the overall 
parties. Within each party there will be individuals and 
factions with slightly different viewpoints and priorities. 
While there were subtle differences in approach, this section 
provides a high-level overview of the approach taken to 
gaining support from the parties.
4 The description of reform efforts and reflections on them 
are primarily based on personal conversations with Jerry 
Madden, Marc Levin from the Texas Public Policy Foundation, 
Doug Smith from the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition and 
Nick Hudson from the American Civil Liberties Union, Texas.
5 For an example of the opposite approach, consider 
Corrections’ decision, subsequently deemed unlawful, to 
substantially limit access to the Release to Work programme 
after Phillip John Smith absconded: see Fitzgerald, 2019.
6 The Latino imprisonment rate is similar to their overall 
proportion of the population, but this represents a significant 
increase in Latino imprisonment levels compared to 
historical levels.
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